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, Financial markets are usually deemed efficient if they
Gerente Administrativa
   
Sebastiana de Sousa Barros { have “the capacity to allocate scarce savings to investors
Siiicwisdio _ with the socially most productive use for them, usually
Glaucia Aguiar measured by the (social) rate of return on investment”
De eit Akyiiz, 1992: 11). In turn, for at least the last two decades,
BEAUUHEACo Ana Cecilia Jettar dost macro-economists have argued that financial
BY BRAGEE: etranic liberalisation is the road to higher levels of domestic savings/
Datar,. 2] ” bier Aiharg investment and moreefficient allocation of capital. Efficiency  
Ne Regi? 6 sy; . is thus clearly associated with a more “liberalised”,
04312723 ite Almeida eee deregulated financial market.
Olavio a Silva nis oes Elsewhere, wecritically assessed the view that financial
liberalisation could perse lead to higher levels of saving and
investment, even if it may stimulate the process of “financial
deepening” (Studart, 1994). In this paper, we argue that one
STUDART. Rowe, of the problems of conventional analysis lies on the fact that
the concept of efficiency used by mainstream financial




The efficiency of the fiRogério Studar a nancial system to development./ ‘ aspects of intermediation, assuming that an efficient
» 77 Rio de Janciro: UFRI/EI, 1994. microeconomic position will inevitably result in efficient
33p.: 21 om. - performance of financial systems in the macroeconomic(Texto ' x : ‘ : 2 eapara Discussao. IEI/UFRJ; 321) scenario. Further, this article builds on critical assessment
Bibliografia: p. 27 of the concept of efficiency usually implicit in most
mainstream analyses to propose an alternative, based on
Keynes's and Post-Keynesians’ views on investment finance
and funding.
1. Sistema Financciro. I. Titulo. II Série
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The paperis organised as follows. In the next section,we critically assess the established view on (allocative)efficiency. In section 3, we present an alternative approachto the investment finance, which builds on ourinterpretationof Keynes’s views on finance and funding and his liquiditypreference theory of the interest rate. We build upon thefindings of section 4 to Propose an alternative concept ofefficiency ofthe financial market in the context of a monetatheory of production. Section 5 summarisesthefjndings andconcludes this paper.
“en
2. The Conventional Wisdom
The established view on efficiency offinancial systemhas twopillars: the loanable funds theory and the efficientmarket hypothesis. The former is in turn based on whatelsewhere we named “the Prior-saving argument” (seeStudart, 1993; 1994), that is, the hypothesis that Saving andinvestment are independently determined in the market forcapital, where therealinterest rate is the adjustment variableOne important Corollary of such a view is that a real rate ofinterest which is below the equilibrium one would resulteither in a Shortage of loanable funds to investment or“forced savings”.
The secondpillar ofcontemporary finance theory is thecompetitive capital market Paradigm (see Lewis, 1992),From the Perspective of such a Paradigm, a Singlecompetitive capital market allocates Saving/investmentoptimally, independently ofthe time structure of the goodsitfinancing; hence inefficiency attaches to anything outside that
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paradigm, including (andespecially), for instance, segmented
markets. :
If we take such a view toits logical limits, in perfectly
competitive walrasian economy, there is no role for financial
institutions: having full information of the best investment,
any saver would be able to allocate their saved resources
according to its intertemporal preference and in the most
productive (and hence profitable) way. The role of
institutional analysis is thus to point to the “imperfections” of
real-life financial structures and, perhaps, to the ways ofre-
establishing the sovereignty of the market forces.
From such a perspective, as mentioned above, the
question offinancing long-lived assets in a market economy
also becomes secondary: perfectly competitive capital market
will supply the economy with all its needs of financing, be it
short or long term; the time structure ofthe rate ofinterest
will accommodated the intertemporal preferences and the
risk aversion of savers. The only way the analysis becomes
relevant is when the strong assumptions behind the perfect-
market paradigm arecriticised. That is, the only way out
from the straight-jacket of the “sound microfoundations” of
new-walrasian economicsis to point to marketfailures which
inhibit the achievement of the equilibrium results of such
economics.’
It is not surprising, then, that the increasingly popular
new keynesian models have focused on heroic assumptions
about the availability and distribution of information between
borrowers, lenders andfinancial institutions. The relaxation
of the perfect information hypothesis permitted these models
 
2 This has been the core ofthe so called New-Keynesian economics. Foran extensive surveyofsucha literature. see Blanchardand Fisher(1 989).
a
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to explain the role for financial intermediaries in a
competitive economy:the lack of costless information gives
financial intermediaries the role of assessing the credit-
worthiness of borrowers.> It is this “artifice” which allows
such models to use the walrasian framework, and yet have
anything to say aboutreal-life financial structures.
For instance, a common theme in this new line of
thought in financial economics is, in a nutshell, that
“informational asymmetries may introduce inefficiencies in
financial markets which may have quantitatively significant
real effects” (Gertler, 1988: 560; my emphasis). Furthermore,
the growing literature on information and incentives
information also points to two problems in financial
intermediation which can jeopardise theallocative role played
by intermediation: adverse selection, where trading parties
have asymmetric information prior to contracting, and moral
hazard, where the asymmetries arise after contracting.*
 
3 Credit-worthiness here is defined, accordingly, as the capacity to repay
Which in the long runis associated with the return of the borrower’s
investment project. A recent application of this view that financial
institutions are “social accountants and screeningdevices for the allocation
of credit” is found in Stiglitz (1988).
+ Asymmetric information occurs when lenders have trouble determining
whether a borroweris a good risk (that is, good investment projects with
lowdefault risk) or a bad risk (bad investment projects with high default
risk). Because ofthis lack of information, lenders will desire to payfor a
securitythat reflects the average qualityof firms issuing the securities - a
price whichis higher than the market value for high qualityfirms, and too
high for the low quality ones - a classic case of ‘the lemons problem’
proposed by Akerlof(1970). Hence. onlylowqualityfirms will be willing
to sell their securities. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) also demonstrated, using
a loanable funds framework. adverse selection would generate credit
6 texto para discussdéo - iei/ufrj
The two casesjust point to the possibility that, due to
asymmetric information, the financial system maynotplay its
role as broker in the saving-investment processefficiently. In
other words, in these cases loanable funds to investment will
be lower than potential and allocation of resources will be
distorted. This literature presents an embarrassing challenge
to the view that financial markets are efficient allocators of
capital. But, in reality, it does not seem to advance much
from the neo-classical perspective: the role of the financial
system is still to be an intermediary between saving and
investment in a world where information is “still” imperfectly
distributed;* and what is at stake is how well this role is
performed.
This type of argument leads to the view that, wereit
not for the problems generated by imperfect information
distribution or other marketfailures, then that role would be
fully restored and allocative efficiency of capital would
prevail. Even there is room for the analysis of “defective”
institutional framework (i.e. one which are far from the
stylised single competitive capital markets), the stimulus for
saving, especially by maintaining high interest rates, is always
prescribed and ‘he meanto increase saving and investment§
 
rationing because lowquality firms with riskier projects will be the ones
willing to pay the highestinterest rates. If lenders cannot identify riskiest
projects. thenthe supplyof loanable funds will shrink when interest rates
increasc. exactly the opposite result fromthat theoretically expected. The
danger of moral hazard mayprevent lenders from extending credit. if
when the interest rate makes it very attractive to do so. In other words,
lending would be at sub-optimal levels.
5 In particular banks are seen as mere “social accountants and scrcening
devices for the allocationofcredit" (Stiglitz. 1988) or “delegated monitors
of borrowers on behalf of the depositors” (Diamond. 1984).
6 See c.g. Gersovitz. 1988-89: 382: my emphasis.
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To sum up, these recent developments explore
deviations from the perfect markets paradigm as regards the
optimal allocation of the asses of financial intermediaries.
As far as the theory is concerned, the liabilities side is an
exogenous variable, determined by the preferences of
consumers/savers. The identification of finance and saving is
still sovereign, and here lies the main problem.
** x
Whenit comes to applying the conventional view on
the financial sphere of market economies, the PS argument
becomes the “financial liberalisation” model. This states that
financial markets in developing countries are underdeveloped
due to the historical repression of interest rates by the
government. Because of the lack of incentive for savings,
savers prefer to consume and/or buy short-term assets;
further, because offinancial repression, government cannot
have access to bonds markets. This, in turn, leaves no option
for the government but to recourse to inflationary financing.
Finally, inflation reduces even further the real interest rate,
closing the vicious circle caused byfinancial repression.’
There is no empirical evidence of a strong relationship
between the rate of interest and the supply of savings (see
World Bank, 1989 and Frenkel and Fanelli, 1993, p.7).
Further, there is significant evidence that the process of
financial deepening per se does not imply higher levels of
investment (Cf. Fry, 1989; World Bank, 1989; AKkyiiz,
1992).
7 Fora critical assessment of such a view on finance and economic
development. see Studart (1993).
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cash in his pocket or with a cheque drawn on a bank, which
he hands in on the understanding that he is entitled in return
to a claim to cash (i.e. a deposit) which he can either exercise
or transfer to someone”; it is active if the bank creates a
claim againstitself in favour of a borrower, in return for his
promise of reimbursement (Keynes, 1930: 20-1).
If passive deposit-creating dominates in stage |, active
deposit-creation is the norm in stage 2. In the active deposit
creation, if cash reserves are depleted below a certain
minimum “margin of safety” (determined by banks’
expectations and the institutional structure), banks can
borrow surplus reserves from eachother, sell other assets, or
even borrow directly from the money market against
certificates of deposits.
The existence of stage-2 credit-creating banks provides
the monetary production economy with a flexibility and
capacity for accumulation inconceivable in a barter
economy.” It also increases the complexity of the process of
investment finance: the funds available for investment
represent only a segmentofthe pool of funds created by the
banking system to finance several activities - from the
production of consumption goods to stock exchanges
(Keynes, 1939: 283). Savings become only one segment of
such a pool of funds, and not its only source.
Therefore, it is important to emphasise that, first, in
Keynes’s theory, the aggregate supply of finance is mainly
determined by the banks’ willingness to actively create
deposits and credit, and no/ by savers’ preferences, second,
that the interest rate is neither determined by the forces of
productivity and thrift, nor is it the variable that guides the
 
9 Onthis sce also Schumpeter (1934).
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allocationofcapital. Rather, the rate of interest is a moneta
phenomenon, conjointly determined by monetary volicy,
Panisat| Strategies and the liquidity preference of
A mal-functioning banking system represents the failure
of an important part ofthe credit system - and therefore the
reduction of the capacity of the entrepreneur economy to
advance purchasing powerto investors willing to grow
Ultimately, this may mean the failure of the system of
payments on an economy which, being decentralised relies
on such a system in order to produce,distribute reproduce
and grow. In this sense, the historical reason for the
developmentofcentral banks and of regulatory instruments
was not to preserve banks as “delegated monitors” orscreening devices” for savers, but to preserve the systefrom possible instabilities and ruptures (see Goodhart 1975.chapter VIII), which would directly affect the fiunctio ingand growth ofthe monetary economy. me
To sum up,it is bank credit, not saving, which playsthe crucial role in the financing of investment. This wo idappearto leave no role for saving, but suchis far from b iae case. The key to understanding such a “hidden facet”ofsry offinancinga no wie i risks (in Knightinian; ssets with long-term maturity ininherently uncertain market economies - where the demandfor liquidity is always hj .
ys high for a signifi
holders. This is our next topic. Smeant part of wealth-
3.2. Revisiti ate ohsiting Keynes's dilemma: Savings andthe financial market
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The importance of the allocation of individual savings,
and therefore of financial intermediation, to support growth
emerges, in Post-Keynesian literature whenfunding - thatis,
the process of transformation of short-term into long-term
liabilities - is discussed.
As Keynes taught us, from the microeconomic
perspective, entrepreneurs and bankers desire to fund their
long-term commitments on a stable basis because of the
uncertainty about the prospective conditions of credit and
levels of interest rates. Thus, the reason for funding can be
interpreted as a response to a menacing increase in both
borrower’s and lender’s risks (Keynes, 1936: 144). Hence,
investment finance in a world of uncertainty is
characteristically a twofold process of finance and funding."
Being the /ocus where funding takes place, financial
markets have an important role in supporting growth. From
a microeconomic perspective, they may increase the
predisposition of firms and banks to engagein the financing
of long-lived assets. Another interrelated microeconomic
function is the provision of information for firms issuing
securities, underwriters and demanders of securities. This
10 “The entreprencur when he decidesto invest hasto be satisfied on two
points:firstly, that he can obtainsufficient short-termfinance during the
period of producingthe investment: and secondly. that he can eventually
fund his short-term obligations by a long term issue on satisfactory
conditions. Occasionally he maybe in
a
position to use his own resources
or to makehis long-termissueat once: but this makesno differenceto the
amount of‘finance’ which has to be found by the market as a whole. but
onlyto the channel through whichit reaches the entrepreneur and to the
probability that some part of it may be found bythe release of cash on the
part of himselfor the rest ofthe public. Thusit is convenient to regard the
twofold process as the characteristic one” (Keynes. 1937: 217).
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informational role can be summarised as follows (Cf. Bain,1981: 61): (1) secondary markets signal the price of newissues ofsecurities; (2) secondary markets make underwritingby specialised financial institutions a less risky business;"!and (3) secondary markets enable investors to evaluate theProspective profitability of newly-issued securities byenhancing the flow ofinformation.
The existence of the secondary markets (where oldsecurities are sold and bought) relies on continuoustrading,which provides the liquidity that makes it less risky for
wealth-owners to hold long-term securities. It is this
provision of liquidity which makes long-term bonds and
securities attractive to savers - who, as Davidson (1986) has
rightly putit, are searching for safe liquidity time-machines,
and rarely wish to be locked in to holding an asset for a long
period oftime.
Therefore, in the perspective of chapter 12 of TheGeneral Theory, financial markets have an important, but yetambiguous, role in supporting growth. They intermediatebetween the demanders of securities and those firms wishingto fund their short-term liabilities, and this Capacity broadensthe system’s ability to transform maturities. But one cannotforget the negative side, that is, the instability brought by the
I] The underwriter bea oa:we: rs the responsibility for isitiSecurities which are not absorbe > ihe acquisition of the





speculative nature of these markets. These are the reasons
behind Keynes’s “mixed feelings” about capital markets:
The spectacle of modern investment markets has
sometimes moved me towards the conclusion that to make
the purchase of an investment permanent and indissoluble,
like marriage, except by reason of death or other grave
cause, might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils.
For this would force the investor to direct his mind to the
long-term prospects and to those only. But a little
consideration of this expedient brings us up against a
dilemma, and shows us how the liquidity of investment
markets often facilitates, though it sometimes impedes, the
course of new investment. For the fact that each individual
investor flatters himself that his commitment is “liquid”
(though this cannot be true for all investors collectively)
calms his nerves and makes him much more willing to run a
risk. If individual purchases of investment were rendered
illiquid, this might seriously impede new investment. so long
as alternative ways in which to hold his savings are available
to the individual. This is the dilemma. (Keynes, 1936: 160;
my emphasis).
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, funding and,
therefore, financial markets also bear a role which is seldom
spelled out. That is, the role of mitigating the increasing
financial fragility inherent in a growing monetary economy.
As we pointed out elsewhere (Studart, 1994), this
characteristic of the growing market economy emerges from
the fact that the expansion of credit is a sine qua non
condition for growth, and credit is expanded basically
through bank-money creation. Because of the structure of
banks’ liability, either such credit is short term, and the
borrowers’ risk will be rising, or, if the banks agree to
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finance long-term positions, they will be accepting higher
liquidity risks. In a way or another, growth will be followed
by an increase of what Minsky (e.g. 1982) named systemic
financial fragility.
Therefore, one may say that the existence of
mechanism to fund investment is a necessary, but yet not
sufficient, condition to a financially stable economic growth.
This macroeconomic role of savings and financial markets
will very much depends upon twointerrelated characteristics
of these markets: their size andtheir stability. A thin financial
marketis unlikely to be able to increaseits levels of operation
rapwy w thout spnifiant shifts of asset prices)" and a
volatile financial market can provoke sudden shifts of the
rate of interest and, therefore, be more damaging than
supportive of the process of growth."3
3.3. Investmentfinance andfunding and the institutionalframework
As stressed earlier, what makes the financial markets
functional actors to economic growthisits ability to transform
short-term assets which are demanded by savers as forms of“liquidity time-machines” into long-term sources of funding.
12 Zysman (1983: 60) shares
markctsolves particular probl
and sellers meansthatanysell
that routine price fluctuation
a similar viewpoint: “The large secondary
cms. For example.a large number ofbuyers
crsis likelyto finda buyer and, consequently,
$ are apt to be less than they would be inasmall market. Small seconda
f
ait i ‘ary markets. then, could be thou h ‘pose1" estors to a risk of market fluctuations...” ene exesIt is wi aresomabs wes that Not are only thin markets highlyBae ndvo Auile.buteitherisspeculation a short-term phenomenonwhic! i itends to disappearin the long run. Muchto the contrary, as noted
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This maturity transformation assumesdifferent possible forms
accordingto theinstitutional background behind the financial
structure. For instance, as Davidson (1986)illustrates, in the
segmentedfinancial markets whichexisted in the US before the
deregulation ofthe 1980s, the commercial banksprovided sight
and short-term deposits against short-term commercial and
industrial loans; investment banks were specialised in
converting short-term borrowing into long-term borrowing
through underwriting operations; and institutional investors
(e.g. insurance companies and pension funds) would invest
savings on behalf of the general public."
Even though the finance-funding process pictured by
Davidsonis somehowideal,it is possible to expand investment
throughshort-termcredit, without causingincreasesin financial
fragility if there are no significant technical indivisibilities and
the maturity ofinvestmentis very short. Thisis problemthe case
of someagricultural economies or countries in the early stages
industrial development. However, once the stage of
industrialisation has reached the point where investments
involve millions of dollar, and technical indivisibilities are one
mainbarrier to entry, then the question of funding becomes
essential; and so does the development of institutions
specialised in transformingliquid assets into long-term funding.
The problemis thatinstitutional environments are, by
nature, constantly changing and, notwithstanding deterministic
earlier. the very existence of the secondary markets (where old securitics
are sold and bought) relics on divergent asset expectations and speculative
buys andsales.
14 Infact. Davidson's example has becomea stylized form of describing
the process of finance-funding in Post-Keynesian literature. Nothing
wrong withthat, as long as one docs not loosesight ofthe institutional
background of Davidson's story.
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faith, nothing can guarantee that developmentwill lead to a
uniquefinancialstructure.Forinstance, one ofthe characteristic
developmentsin the early years of industrialisation in Britain,
wherethe Industrial Revolution began, was the rapid evolution
of the banking system.'’ The market for long-term securities
camelater and consolidated at a slower pace than the banking
system.'* But, until the mechanisms to fund investment were
poorly developed, the role of British banking wascrucial in
providing an increased supply ofmeans ofpaymentto meet the
rapidly increasing demand for money associated with
industrialisation, higher incomes, and the monetisation of the
entire economy(see Pollard, 1964: 41).
The development of capital markets has not been so
uniform in many other nations - a phenomenonconfirmed by
Zysman’s (1983) classification offinancial systemsas capital
market-based and credit-based systems. The capital market-
based system is one where securities (stocks and bonds) are
the main source of long-term funding. There is a wide range
of capital and money-market instruments, a large numberofspecialised financialinstitutions offer competing services, andPrices are determined by the interplay of supply and demand.In credit-based financial systems, on the contrary, the capitalmarket is weak and firms depend heavily on credit for raisingfinance beyond retained earnings.
—__
:Peniie Cameronet al (1967) and Kennedy(1987).ahd. TI me bytheertyaemarket originate between 1689
acquired a key position in the British fin cialae ye -. iadimportancethat ofthe Bankof England untilthe System, rivalling inand, he mid nineteenth centuryit dealt chiefly in government securities. The insurance companies,Conversely. did invest a Portionoftheir a ini i j
! y
ssels n industrthis. see Cameron (1967)
stonesEa
‘.
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In a nutshell, one of the important differences between
the two typesoffinancial structure is the existence or not of
funding mechanisms. This difference has, in turn,
consequences as regards the ways whichinvestment can be
supported bythe existing financial institutions. As mentioned
above, from the theoretical perspective adopted thus far, the
lack of organised financial markets can have two destabilising
consequences for development: first, finance will tend to be
very short-term and credit rationing may occurin times of
growth; again, this has to do more with the rapid increase of
borrower’s andlender’s risks than anything else. If financial
markets remain underdeveloped and funding is not available,
banks’ liquidity preference will be high and they mayrefrain
from expanding their lending activity when the demandis
rising rapidly.'7
Second, if finance is forthcoming to sustain growth,
the financial position of both firms and bankswill become
more fragile (how rapidly depends on the rate of growth).
Further, even if they do lend morein times of growth, banks
will almost certainly prefer short-term loans (say towards the
financing of consumption, working capital and/or
speculation) to longer-term, and hence, riskier, investment
projects.'* If banks are still prepared to finance expansion
 
17 This could be a theoretical explanation for Zysman’s empiricalevidence that “... where capital markets emerged to finance industrialdevelopment, bank lending has been traditionallylimited to short-termPurposes. Where capital markets were neither adequate norreliablesources of developmentfunds, banks or specialized institutionsfilled thegap with loans” (Zysman, 1983: 61).
18 As Zysmanpoints out.this is directlylinked to the risks of long-termlending: “Anyloanis a gamble on the future solvencyofthe client, but along-term loan involves a newkind ofrisk. Obviously, a long-termloan
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despite the lack of appropriate mechanisms to fund
investment, the indebtedness ofthe corporate sector has to
increase. Growth will only be sustained if a section of
investing firms borrowsshort, hoping to repay by borrowing
until their investment matures and begins to produce
additional cash inflows (using Minsky’s terminology, more
and more investors and financiers will adopt Ponzi
strategies).
Because the weight of speculative finance tends to
increase with the acceleration of investment, credit-based
systems are thus extremely vulnerable to changes in credit
conditions (especially in shifts in money interest rates) in
timesof growth. If the financing of long-lived assets is
supplied mainly through short-term renewable loans, achange in the rate ofinterest will represent a significant risein firms’ financial expenditures; if firms try to adjust bycutting other expenditures simultaneously, this may set inmotion a vicious circle of financial reactions which couldreduce effective demand even further.
—
on the business ofa client cannotin reality be secured by any physical
depositedfernnna .ank gels the bulk of the moneyit uses from funds
for five years, durin the at the going interest rate. Ifit lends. firm money
at whichpointtI 6 “ic period. the depositors may withdrawtheir funds
point tte bank's reserves drOp andit must reduceits loans: in an




4. The Efficiency of Financial Markets
Howshould wedefine “efficiency”, given the paradigm
so far adopted? Assuming that economic growth is an
necessary, but not sufficient, condition to achieve superior
welfare, efficiency is hereafter defined as follows: a financial
system is efficient to development when it expandsthe use of
existing resources of a economy with the minimum possible
increase in financial fragility and other imbalances that may
halt the process of growth for purely financial reasons.!®
Efficiency has two distinctive dimensions: one concerns the
stability ofthe financial system (both as a system of payments
and intermediary of loanable funds) and anotheris related to
the allocation of real resources. This first is the
macroeconomic dimension, the second, the microeconomic.
As regards the macroeconomic dimension, the
efficiency ofthe financial structure should be judged by how
well it performs the functions of financing and funding; in
other words, howit supports financially stable growth. In the
microeconomic dimension, efficiency relates to the ability to
provide finance and funding for the investors at the lowest
possible cost. It is important to understand that the two types
of efficiency are not contingent on one another: a financial
structure may have developed finance/funding mechanisms,
but be, at the same time, maintain high costs of
intermediation between ultimate lender and ultimate
19 The concept should not be confounded with Tobin's (1984) concept of
Junctionalefficiency, which refers to the cost efficiency in “producing”
finance in the processofintermediation betweenultimate lenders and
borrowers. Tobin's viewis onlysimilar to ourconcept of“microeconomic”
functionality, but ignores the macroeconomic perspective, which is
central to our view.
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borrower. It can also be technologically sophisticated and
cost minimizer, and highly inefficient from the
macroeconomic perspective.”
Still concerning the macroeconomic functions
described above, it is important to stress that, from the
perspective adopted here, there is no reason why appropriate
mechanisms to finance and fund accumulation will
spontaneously evolve in the process of economicdevelopment, especially when such developmentis rapid (seeStudart, 1994: chapter 4). Indeed, on the one hand, financialinstitutions (and especially banks)will, because of the liabilitystructure, prefer to remain in the shorter end of financing ifthat is possible.
In a fast-growing economy, with constant pressure onfinance, the financial institutions can profitably grow simplyby providing short-run finance to credit-thirsty enterprises.Neither private banks nor other financial institutions will havecompetitive stimulus to finance long-term positions. In thiscase, in order to grow,firmswill have recourse to renewableshort-term credit, self-funding or foreign indebtedness inorder to implement their investment projects.
A macroeconomically efficient financial market is onewhere secondary markets act as Promoters of fundingoperations. Here “Keynes’s dilemma” is the basis tounderstand the strengths and limitations of such markets todo so. Developed financial markets may play an importantrole in providing mechanisms to fund investment, and thedevelopment of stable financial markets may be desirable.
20 This seemsto applyto the Brazilian case nowadaysophisticated banking system and financial markets. but with veryunderdeveloped private mechanisms to finance accumulation. On this,sec for instance. Revista Exame of 22 June 1994,
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But this development may require fine monitoring and a
long-term strategy - and not simply short-term incentives to
securities buyers. Thin financial markets - which are the rule
in LDCs (Goldsmith, 1969: McKinnon, 1973; World Bank,
1989)- tend to be highly speculative and manipulated by few
big insiders, which create a comprehensive mistrust by most
small savers and even somepotential institutional investors,
such as pension funds. Therefore, stability should be priority,
especially in “emerging markets” and the development of
capital markets should be carried out with careful regulation
by the authorities. This regulation can be loosened according
to the development of such markets, butit is unlikely that
complete deregulation will ever be compatible with
financially stable growth.
Finally, it is important to rememberthat the existence
of developed financial markets is neither a sufficient, nor a -
necessary condition for efficient transformation of assets
(funding). Indeed, as we discussed earlier, in countries
where financial markets did not develop sufficiently to
Support financially stable growth, onefinds “compensating”
arrangements. That is, the emphasis that mainstream theory
has placed on the need for a “market-friendly, capital-market-
oriented” financial development as means of achieving a
more “efficient” financial structure is unwarranted by
empirical evidence.”' If one abandonsthe belief that the
natural outcome of
a
liberalised economy is an optimal
allocation of resources through a single capital market, the
 
21 Takeforinstance the examplesofGermany. where the role ofthe strong
commitment on the part of the German universal banks in supportingassociated firmsis recognised as oneofthe basis ofthe rapid andrelativelyStable development of that country: or the case of Japan, where thedevelopmentoffinancial/corporate conglomerate has been the financial
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question ofcreation of appropriate institutions to co-ordinate
and to promote an expansion and a socially fair distribution
of income emerges almost naturally. In other words, the
State, if not a panacea to solve the many problems of adecentralised economy, may play a crucial role in adapting
the shape and the functioning of economic institutions inorder to achieve a “certain”, politically established, efficient
allocation of resources and wealth.
——_—______.
strong armofthe “Japanese miracle”: or. just to mention one ofthe Asiandragons (paradoxically which has been used as example of “market-fricndly development”). take the case of South Korea where the closegovernment intervention suchas the creation of development banks and —he use of regulated selective credit mechanism has served to boostindustrial investment which resulicd the one of the most astonishingeconomic performanceofthe History ofindustrial economies. Fordetaileddescription ofthe functioning ofthe financial systems in these countriessce Mayer. 1988 (Germany): Sommel, 1992 (Japan): and Amsden andEuh, 1990 (South Korea).
22 The “hands-offliberal Proposal. which proposes a Shrinkage ofgovernmentintervention is obviouslynot political neutral. As Fanelli andFrenkel remind us: “Theliberalizationliterature has taught us much aboutthe possible distortiveconscquences of,protectionist andother interventionistpolicics, but thereis nothingcomparable interms ofresearch effort devotedto analysing what has happenedin Concrete situations ofderegulation. Forexample. is the privatization process Prone to domination by interestgroups as wasthe case with the 1S] [import-substitution-industrialik ie 4 alization]-ike policies ? Would not such a Process open big opportunities for rentsecking and directly unproductiv:C profit-secking activities ? ‘anelljFrenkel. 1993: 82)”, 8 activities (Fanelli and





In conventional theory, the role ofthe financial system
is normally presented twofold: to equip the economy with
paymentfacilities and to “provide savers and investors with
financial instruments which have characteristics suited to
their diverse needs”. The neo-classical matrix allows the
analyst to distinguish between money and “real” phenomena,
characterising the deposit-taking institutions as semi-
technical money-creators. Thus, the role of intermediation
between savers and investors receives the focus of most
analyses of financial systems.
As a result, the conceptofefficient financial system is
normally associated with the capacity of system to provide
the best distribution of information to guide consumersin the
intertemporal allocation of income and wealth. As regards
the institutional framework,it follows from such an approach
that the most efficient financial structure is the fully
competitive financial structure, which is devoid of
informational asymmetries. When it comes to economic
policy,liberalising proposals are the logical outcome ofsuch
a view, and the question ofinstitutional developmentis left
to a secondary plan.
From Post Keynesian perspective, where finance and
investment precede saving and the allocation of liquid
financial wealth takes place in a inherently uncertain
environment, the role of the financial system is defined
differently. Finance depends on banks? willingness to
advance purchasing power to entrepreneurs, willingness
whichis crucial to allow the monetary production economy
to grow. Funding depends on the capacity of existing
financial markets to intermediate between savers’ desire to
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store financial assets as “liquidity time-machines”, and
investors’ demand for a stable long-term financing oftheir
long-lived assets.
From Post Keynesian perspective a financial system isefficient to the process of growth if it has credit-creatingpower, funding mechanisms and maintain robustnessthroughout the process of growth. Even though Keynes’sview was based on a specific institutional framework (i.e.capital-market based financial structure), the questions raisedby the distinction between finance and funding seeminglyapplies to the analysis of any financial Structure of a marketeconomy. Indeed, the institutional evolution which led tocapital-market financial structure is neither norm, neitheris arequirement for an efficient financial market: in fact Histogives us plenty of examples of successful developingeconomies where the evolution of credit-based financialStructure was part of a wider Successful developmentstrategy.
. In order to establish policies towards a more efficient- in the sense here used -, one has to bear in mind the broadcharacteristics of each financial Structure. Keynes insistedthat the “dark side” of capital-market based system isassociated with the possible instability of interest rates andproposed sovernments to intervene when such instabilityimpaired investment and growth. Credit-based financialsystems, in turn, cannot support high levels of growth unlessother financial arrangements are created. This may be thebasis to understandthe role ofcertain Structures of German-type universal banks and of development banks, not asanomalies which impair the efficient allocation of capital butas institutions which may improve such an efficiency.
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In themselves, these empirical evidences would be
enough to demystify the financial liberalisation hypothesis
and to makethe analyst search for an alternative view on the
role of banks and other financial institutions in market
economies. As a consequence, this search must lead to an
also alternative view on what “efficiency” is meant when
discussing financial systems. Next we will offer one possible
alternative view, based on Keynes’s paradigm of the
monetary production economy’.
3. Investiment Finance, Funding and Uncertainty
That the “prior-saving argument” is a pre-Keynesian
concept, as Keynesinsisted in many parts of his work that
investment preceded saving. What is not often remembered
is that Keynes perceived such a view as a fallacious
foundation to understand the financial sphere of a monetary
production economy. In our opinion, Keynes’s alternative
view can beinterpreted through a sharp distinction between
Jinance, saving and funding.
3.1. Finance
In Keynes’s general theory, banks and entrepreneurs
are the key agents in the determination ofeffective demand,
and hence, of employment and output; consumers/savers are
put in a secondary role of determining the income multiplier.
 
8 For a description of the foundationsofPost Keynesian economics, that
its, the concept of monetary production economysee Carvalho (1992,
chapter 3).
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This is because, as will be fully discussed in this section, in
an entrepreneur economy, saving does not financeall
investment (especially in a growing economy) and finance
precedes investment.
The starting point of Keynes’s analysis is his rejection
of Say’s Law throughhis theory of effective demand. As we
have shown elsewhere (Studart, 1994), electing investment
as the causa causans in the determination of Output and
employment demands that finance be independent from
previous saving. In turn, the evolution of privately issuedmoney, so well described in the first volume of Keynes’sTreatise on Money (especially in chapter 3) is critical inunderstanding the relevance of Keynes’s assi::rntion of theindependenceoffinance from saving.
Accordingly, as Chick (1983; 1986) has shown in hertheory of the development of the banking system, only in avery early stage of this development do banks depend onprevious deposits to create credit. Only in this first stage(Chick’s Stage 1), are banks’ notes restrictively accepted forsettling transactions and loans totally backed by previousdeposits. Hence, Only in this Stage do deposits necessarily
saving reasons (Chick’s stage 2).
€ their balance-sheet
SSive Or an active
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